3 duties, the article will discuss in turn the wartime diplomatic protection offered to British subjects in Russia and the obligations demanded by both sides of those who had become naturalized Russian subjects. Each of these issues came into sharp focus in February 1855, when the British government branded as traitors those naturalized British entrepreneurs in St Petersburg who contracted to manufacture engines for Russian warships and the Russian government refused to release their unwilling British artisans. However, since such questions are best considered in the context of earlier developments in the British community, the article begins with the shaping of allegiances in the reign of Nicholas I. 15 
Pre-war allegiances: British residents in Russia, 1825-1854
'Foreigners', confided General L.V. Dubelʹt to his commonplace book sometime in the 1840s, 'are the vermin which Russia warms with her sunshine, and burns them so that they crawl out to bite her'. But since Russia's leading secret policeman thought that the most offensive thing about foreigners was their condescension --'These scoundrel foreigners all think that they are better and cleverer than us' --he wanted Russia to exploit their expertise in order to match and outsmart them. That was why he supported orders for British marine engines, the naval hardware that later provoked the most controversial episode in the history of the British in Russia. Contradictions in the mind of 'le général double' were obvious to his contemporaries. 16 It has taken historians longer to appreciate the extent to which, by representing a more widespread schizophrenia, they inadvertently helped to shape a series of foreign communities whose allegiances were no less complex.
In April 1854, shortly after the outbreak of the Crimean War, Dubelʹt's Third Section counted 904 'English' residents in St Petersburg; in 1855 a further 453 were registered in Moscow, where they constituted 6.3 per cent of a foreign community dominated by 3635
Germans. Taking into account the textile workers based in surrounding districts, it was estimated that approximately 1500 Britons lived in Moscow province at the end of the war. 17 Colonies of mill hands in the provinces of Vladimir and Tverʹ swelled the numbers further along with smaller enclaves and individuals scattered across the empire. There would surely have been more had Nicholas I not determined to tighten surveillance over foreigners through a stream of edicts implemented by provincial governors and co-ordinated by the Third Section. 18 As so often, his instinct to control outweighed the need for independent initiative and Russia's relative economic backwardness came partly to be blamed on the tsar's restrictions on foreign entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, since such restrictions served to raise rewards in the sectors in highest demand, the possibility that the economy might have 4 performed better should not obscure the fact that a number of foreign settlers made their fortune in Russia. The Bremen cotton merchant Ludwig Knoop dominated the textile industry by linking British machine builders to the Russian entrepreneurs for whom he acted simultaneously as agent, technical adviser and banker. 19 Thousands more calculated that whether as a result of financial opportunity, emotional ties or sheer desperation they were more likely to prosper in Russia than anywhere else. The British continued to play as varied a part in the influx as they had done since their community took root in the eighteenth century. 20 As the wartime exodus showed, the kaleidoscopic range of their occupations included a former valet to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon. 21 Apart from the labourers, however, most were merchants, engineers, teachers or (less frequently noticed)
horsemen.
Though merchants were to be found from Archangel to Odessa, their hub was in St
Petersburg, where several dynasties in the British Factory successfully diversified in the face of the faltering trade in Russian naval stores. 22 In an under-monetized empire, credit had long been supplied largely by foreign merchants and one contemporary calculated that foreigners controlled no less than 97 per cent of Russia's entire import and export trade in 1847. 23 Visiting Russia in that year, Cobden learned that the empire's cotton mills were 'as a rule either owned by or under the management of foreigners' and managers, many of them 1868. 25 That was the year in which Charles Bell, partner in the St Petersburg finance house of
Thomson Bonar through the 1840s and 1850s, was elected as a Conservative for the City of
London. 26 Since all deals involving Russia were stymied by the Crimean War --in the debate on the Russian Government Securities Bill in August 1854, Palmerston made a point of declaring that it was 'equally treasonable to advance money to the enemy in this country as in In fact, such landowners were a feature of the provinces south of Moscow, where they helped to inspire contemporary caricatures of the angloman. 40 Some, like Semen Iakovlevich Unkovskii in Kaluga, 'a passionate admirer of Dickens', had seen service in the Royal Navy in the reign of Alexander I. 41 Many more were fanatics of the horse racing introduced into Russia by Count Aleksei Orlov. Richard Walkden supplied English stallions to the imperial stud from 1820 to 1827, when he was succeeded by a fellow Lincolnshire man, John Ashton.
A third northern dealer, John Jackson, active in Moscow since the turn of the century, was still a name to conjure with at the Howden horse fair at the outbreak of the Crimean War. 42 'Mr Jackson has regularly drawn off to Russia some of the finest animals we produce', the Foreign Secretary was warned in 1854, 'to which, doubtless, may be ascribed the superior mounting of the Russian soldiers now opposed to ours'. 43 By then, opportunities still existed for the jockeys, trainers and grooms who had first come to Russia more than fifty years earlier. 44 Some may never have left their provincial stud-farms; 45 and a desire to please a state that had rewarded settlers well and was anxious to enrol all its subjects in the soslovie system. 54 Overt pressure to naturalize remained low, not least because its implications were serious. Consider the edict of 1844 which amended the oath of loyal service taken by foreigners who entered Russian state employment without becoming subjects of the tsar.
They were no longer obliged to pledge fealty 'to their true and native Sovereign' (svoemu istinnomu i prirodnomu Gosudariu) because this phrase, 'relating exclusively to Russian subjects, cannot be applied to subjects of other states'. 55 While the amendment confirms Russia's flexibility in the search for foreign talent, it also highlights the uniqueness of a subject's status. Even in the twenty-first century, when citizenship is measured in terms of impersonal statehood, dual nationality remains controversial. 56 At a time when political loyalties in both Britain and Russia remained intensely personal, it was inconceivable to take an oath of equal standing to two sovereigns simultaneously. Naturalization as a Russian subject might only have been temporary and partial, but, for so long as it lasted, Russian law regarded the commitment as unconditional. This was to have significant consequences during the Crimean War, when contradictions with British assumptions were rapidly exposed.
English law, as retrospectively systematized between the 1840s and 1860s, regarded as a British subject every child born within the dominions of the Crown, whatever the nationality of its parents. Strictly interpreted, as Andreas Fahrmeir notes, this ius soli would have made aliens out of all British subjects' children born abroad. 57 Even a less draconian gloss proved hard to apply. In 1859, the Home Office warned that any general issue of certificates of nationality by the British consul in Moscow would be 'very inconvenient' since 'the child of an Englishman born abroad is not a British Subject, unless born in wedlock, which introduces a vast variety of difficult questions'. 58 In wartime, however, attention was focused not on the acquisition of British nationality but on its inalienability.
The Russian government was told in July 1854 that 'the abandonment by a British subject of his national character is not contemplated as possible by the English Law --any act which may be done in furtherance of such an object is considered null & void'. 59 While such a verdict evidently posed difficulties for naturalized Russian subjects, others were also troubled. Perturbed by rumours that the British government would regard as traitors any
British subjects who continued to serve the Russian state, a university professor asked his 9 sister to seek clarification. The Foreign Office confirmed that although it would be treasonable to remain in the military, naval or civil service of a state at war with Britain, the professor had nothing to fear: 'Civilized Nations do not make war against Literature or Science, nor do they desire to prevent their progress even in the Country of an Enemy.'
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Rights: British residents under pressure, 1854-1856
By stressing the permanence of British nationality, the British government intended to highlight not only its subjects' obligations, but also their rights to diplomatic protection. Gray himself soon required Danish assistance, having provoked the Russian authorities by praying that the queen might be granted 'victory over all Her enemies'. As
Plessen drily remarked, the chaplain's explanation that the enemies in question were purely spiritual and internal was unlikely to impress Moscow's governor-general, A.A. Zakrevskii, 'who is known as a man of very plain speech'. 66 To the relief of Gray's family, Plessen settled matters confidentially and services continued uncensored. 67 After all, similar prayers were offered in Russian palace chapels, where the young lady-in-waiting, Anna Tiutcheva, 'experienced a certain satisfaction at the sight of foreign princes … praying to God to deliver us from our enemies, with whom the majority of them are secretly allied'. 68 Neither was this the only incidence of low comedy. A British merchant 'party of pleasure' was rapidly released after crossing the Russian border near Memel (present-day Klaipeda in Lithuania)
equipped with 'many bottles of champagne' but no passports, and in the company of two Prussian 'songstresses'. 69 Plessen's services proved to be equally unnecessary for the superintendent of the Mosolov stud in Moscow province. Ivan Golovin, an outspoken critic of Nicholas I naturalized as a British subject in 1846, told Clarendon that the trainer had been exiled to Siberia for destroying a bust of the tsar in revenge for Russian press criticism of the queen. 70 However, it emerged on investigation that a local court had accepted that the bust had been accidentally smashed by his nephew, the groom Thomas Day, during a drunken scuffle with lads at a rival stable. Both men were unmolested and had left Moscow merely in order to attend the races at Tsarskoe Selo and Lebedian. 71 British residents nevertheless had reason for anxiety in the early months of the war.
The Russian press bristled with alarmist news from London; a quantity of anglophobic verse appeared in the semi-official Severnaia pchela; pamphleteers vilified Palmerston, renowned for his hostility towards Russia, and Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier, the commander of the British fleet in the Baltic which threatened Kronstadt after storming Bomarsund. 72 When
Napier's squadron appeared off Kronstadt in mid-June 1854, the excited imperial family drove out to see it --in an English coach and four. 73 Beyond this royal picnic, the atmosphere was not so light-hearted. In anticipation of Napier's descent, British residents had been banned from their estates on the Gulf of Finland --'I would have banned them […] from the whole of Russia', snorted Dubelʹt --and public opinion remained hostile even once the threat of invasion had evaporated. 74 Though few Britons were denounced to the Third Section, many were subjected to hurtful slights. Wilson, a naturalized Russian subject aged almost eighty, had been commissioned to manufacture marine engines to replace lost British orders, a task widely believed to be beyond his factory's capacity. 92 Neither did he mention that Wilson's need was urgent since his long-serving deputy, James Johnston, had returned to Scotland in a fanfare of publicity rather than accept promotion to Kronstadt and become a Russian subject. 93 All Crichton
13
confirmed from the sanctuary of Sir William's Pavlovsk estate was that 'in the mean time' he wished no further steps to be taken. 94 Those unable to rely on such exalted patronage experienced a more delicate dilemma.
Matilda Peskett, governess to the family of the governor of Minsk, sought to leave when war broke out and was referred to Plessen when difficulties arose; James Stuart Rees, tutor to the family of Count A.F. Orlov, Benckendorff's successor at the Third Section, was presumably relieved to be placed under the baron's protection after asking Clarendon for the impossible:
a passport permitting him to remain in Russia, but to return to Britain whenever he wished. 'what will be the result God only knows'. 114 Now he beseeched his brother to appeal to Clarendon: 'Say that I am detained against my will, and compelled to spend the little money I have in travelling about Russia without any reason being given for it. It can only be done either to ruin me or to compel me to serve them --they will not succeed for as long as they are at war with old England nothing shall induce me to serve them directly or indirectly.' The plea, however, was in vain. Following the fall of Sevastopol on 8 September 1855, the Russians were seen to be anxious 'to diminish the loss they have sustained in the eyes of the nation by representing the greater importance of Nicolaieff as a Naval Port and arsenal'. 115 Grand Duke Konstantin celebrated his twenty-eighth birthday there on 9/21 September at the start of a two-month visit to supervise renovations that were inspected by the tsar himself.
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In the circumstances, Whitworth's detention was inevitably prolonged: he remained confined to Moscow until after the end of the war.
A British subject with more to lose was Alfred Evans, ordered to leave the Russian empire after refusing to take the oath of loyalty to the tsar. Seniavin reported that Evans had been expelled 'because he had shown his enmity to the Government both by his conduct and Petersburg to whom the tsar had 'lately advanced a considerable sum of money to enlarge their premises, on condition that they shall cast and prepare large engines for war steamers'. 123 Though the paper mentioned no names, one of these men was Francis Baird.
'As Mr. Baird is a naturalised Russian subject', Robert Harrison tartly observed, 'and of a rank which enables him to hold serfs, we ought perhaps to moderate our surprise at the circumstances of his having undertaken contracts with the Russian Government, which in time of war no man calling himself an Englishman should have undertaken'. 124 On 15/27
February, Dubelʹt noted that two more British firms --Thomson-Isherwood and Ashford & Stevens --both of which had contracted to manufacture engines for Russian gunboats, had reneged in the light of the queen's proclamation. 'They have been told that if they are not prepared to work, they will be subject to the full force of the laws, which they gave their signatures to obey.'
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Though they affected to be affronted by the proclamation, Russian ministers had little cause for surprise about its contents. When Russia went to war with the Ottomans in October 1853, Nesselrode had been instructed to ask the Foreign Office whether orders placed for British iron bridges on the Moscow-Warsaw railway would be fulfilled in the event of a rupture between the two powers. 126 It had been a key (if unachievable) aim of the Aberdeen Coalition to prevent the export of marine engines to Russia even before Britain declared war. 127 The opening of hostilities was followed in April 1854 by well-publicized seizures on the Thames and the Clyde, resented by the manufacturers but legitimized by a Royal Commission in November; to St Petersburg's embarrassment, vessels laid down for the Russian navy were commandeered as British corvettes. 128 The significance of the February proclamation lay not so much in its content as in its timing. Though Palmerston's role in it is unclear, it was issued two days after he kissed hands as prime minister and symbolized to the Russian government all their longstanding reservations about the new premier. By coincidence, news of it reached them shortly after the promulgation of Nicholas I's manifesto on the formation of local militias, a defensive measure designed to revive memories of the partisans of 1812 that was less warmly received than the government had hoped. 129 A sense of national crisis was intensified when the tsar fell ill and died within a fortnight. Rumours that the nobility had secretly pressed his successor to abandon the militia prompted the Holy Synod to issue a call to arms, proclaimed in all churches on 7/19 March. to have published the Proclamation at the breaking out of the War, when they would have got out of their engagements whereas now the Imperial Government refuse to let some of them leave Russia, and they must therefore either starve or become traitors to Their Country. 132 Though the Foreign Secretary determined to rescue all those placed in this invidious position, it was harder for Plessen to plead on behalf of a lowly social group than on behalf of a few individuals. 133 At first, he apparently made no attempt to do so. In May, he reported only that
Seniavin had yet to respond to his request for passports for two British artisans, and that a further request --made at the instigation of Dr Law for a passport for Francis Baird's cousin, Charles --had been refused. As Clarendon already knew from Bloomfield, Charles Baird, manager of the Baird Works since the mid-1840s, had been charged with inciting its employees to strike. Even if the accusation was unfounded, Plessen believed that Baird faced insuperable 'prejudices', despite influential support for him in the capital. 'Last year', Tiutcheva boasted, 'the Russian fleet had not a single one: now it has 60 of them thanks to the efforts of Grand Duke Constantine who allegedly paid for the construction of a significant proportion of them out of his own fortune'. 135 The grand duke's mentor, A.V.
Golovin, put the figure at 40 vessels. 136 In fact, as the Naval Ministry subsequently confirmed, 32 gunboats had been commissioned in January 1855 and Baird, Thomson, and
Ashford & Stevens had all contributed to the delivery of 23 engines and 26 boilers by 15
May. 137 So Alexander Miller was largely accurate in reporting on 11 July that the Russians had contracted for 36 gunboats (the scale of the subsequent order) and that 21 of them had been finished by the beginning of June. 138 When Bloomfield's successor in Berlin reminded
Clarendon on 1 September that several of Baird's employees were still 'forcibly detained and compelled to work under a threat of being sent as Prisoners into the interior', Plessen was instructed to renew his efforts, this time on behalf of eight British artisans. 139 Again he failed.
Considering the threat of internment real, the baron warned that further intervention would be counterproductive: while the Russian government would have allowed the men to depart at the start of the war, it regarded their decision to stay as irrevocable and dismissed the unlikely that one could be built in view of the profusion of bogs and ravines along the coast.
When it transpired that the Russians had not only made a road but used it to defend
Sevastopol from Raglan's attack, Upton was accused of supplying false information and refused compensation for the loss of his property, valued by him at £4527 in December 1854. Russia's naval reforms continued to rely on foreign expertise well into the 1860s. 157 Even some of the British residents most directly unsettled by the war were keen to return at its end.
The only prominent figure to experience difficulty was Charles Bell, who learned, on applying for a passport in April 1856, that a mark had been placed against his name by the secret police. Wodehouse was surprised to discover the reason why. Unable to secure the prompt release of his brother, an engineer arrested on board an Egyptian steamer in the Black Sea soon after Russia went to war with the Ottoman Empire, Bell had taken 'the imprudent step of writing in strong terms to the Grand Duchess Marie', inviting her to close her account with Thomson Bonar. Nicholas I understandably took offence, 'and as Mr Bell was already on the black list of the police on account of the part taken by him in the secession of English from the English Club some years ago [in 1842], and from his conversation on political topics, the Russian Government determined not to allow [him] to return to Russia after the war'. 158 But these were more optimistic days, symbolized by Dubelʹt's retirement from the Third Section, and Wodehouse had secured a passport for Bell by the end of July. In Warsaw, Douglas Evans was soon collaborating with Charles Vignoles on a £360,000 bid to replace decrepit pontoons across the Vistula with a road and rail bridge. 159 Though that bid failed, the Evans brothers remained in control of their firm until their retirement in the mid-1860s, when it passed into the hands of Lilpop, Rau and Loewenstein. James Stuart Rees apparently settled 24 in Kiev province, where his Russian wife gave birth to a daughter, Olga, in 1876. 160 The Russia Company paid for the widow of one of its members, 'compelled to quit Russia on account of the late war', to return there because she had failed to find employment as a teacher in Britain. 161 Evicted from Lithuania, even the St Clair family kept its interests in Warsaw, where Edmund Bower St Clair became vice-consul in 1900. 162 By 1870, both the tsarist and British governments had moved to alleviate some of the problems of allegiance that plagued them in the Crimean War. Though Alexander II continued, to the perceived disadvantage of British merchants, to offer varying immunities to different 'foreign guests', he promulgated in 1864 an edict that 'embodied a conceptual shift toward the creation of a single, generic, unified citizenship' by making naturalized Russian subjects equal to natural-born subjects in the eyes of the law. 163 Six years later, the British Naturalization Acts of 1870 released from their obligations to the queen all those who had voluntarily naturalized abroad. As they learned from a characteristically incisive pamphlet by their consul, Thomas Michell, British residents in Russia now faced an unprecedentedly stark choice: either to abandon their British nationality, and with it the right to British diplomatic protection, or to remain a British subject with all the obligations that entailed. For those of fighting age, the dilemma was especially acute, though crucial ambiguities relating to others remained unresolved: it would, Michell warned, be 'difficult to define all the cases in which the acts of a British Subject who continued to serve the Russian Government during a war with Great Britain would be considered treasonable'. 164 Those with long memories like the Kronstadt-born Michell knew that armed conflict generated multiple opportunities for betrayal. 165 In 1855, the year in which Michell began his career as translator and interpreter to Russian prisoners of war at Lewes, the British government branded as traitors those naturalized Russian subjects who contracted to manufacture engines for Russian warships, and it regarded the Russian government's refusal to release unwilling British artisans as a breach of the belligerents' agreement to guarantee the protection and security of their respective domiciles. Consonant with the nature of a war in which 'diplomacy had only occasionally been interrupted by battles', the British government arguably devoted as much care to these few vulnerable individuals as it spared for the thousands of its troops languishing in the Crimea. 166 The Russian government, on the other hand, maintained that all those British residents in its service who failed to leave at the beginning of the war were bound to serve its interests thereafter and it refused to release military engineers whose knowledge could be turned against the tsar. One such specialist, William Upton, undoubtedly betrayed Russian secrets, even if he could reasonably claim that 25 the British Army reneged on its promises to compensate him for so doing; another, William Whitworth, resented the sacrifices he made to preserve his allegiance to the queen while Francis Baird had profited from his loyalty to the tsar. Taken as a whole, these conflicted loyalties suggest that the Crimean War should no longer be regarded as a mere ripple on the surface of the history of the British community in Russia. Instead, it merits recognition as an unusually illuminating instance of the complexities of British government policy toward British residents abroad, and of the paradoxes of Russian government policy toward foreigners in the era before systematic persecution of 'enemy aliens' began.
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